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Various initiatives have been pursued in
recent years to enlarge market forces’ role in
promoting a safe and sound financial system.
Faced with dramatic increases in the size, scope,
and complexity of banking organizations, policy-
makers have increasingly considered the possi-
bility that the forces determining prices and
quantities in the financial markets might be har-
nessed to supplement supervisory efforts aimed
at maintaining safety and soundness.
A primary example of the increased em-
phasis on market forces is the comprehensive
approach to capital adequacy recently developed
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
The new framework rests on three pillars—mini-
mum capital requirements, supervisory review,
and market discipline. By including market dis-
cipline, the committee recognizes that market
forces can reinforce capital regulation and other
efforts to promote safety and soundness.
Another example of the new emphasis is
the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999, which
directed the Federal Reserve Board and the
Treasury secretary to assess the appropriateness
and value of requiring large depository institu-
tions to issue subordinated debt. While the re-
sulting study did not recommend the immediate
establishment of such a requirement, the Board
and the Treasury nevertheless concluded that
the evidence supports use of subordinated debt
both in supervisory monitoring and to encour-
age market discipline.
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This article considers only one of several
avenues through which market forces might be
used to support safety and soundness—the idea
that investors’ views on the financial condition
and prospects of banking organizations can be
distilled from stock prices and that such views
can provide a useful supplement to supervisory
assessments. Despite its intuitive appeal, insuffi-
cient analysis has been undertaken to document
the empirical content of this basic idea. As a
result, controversy remains over whether the
financial markets can say anything about the
health and prospects of financial institutions
that supervisors do not already know.
Our empirical work uses supervisory 
ratings as a benchmark for banking organi-
zations’ financial safety and soundness, under
the assumption that the results of supervisory
inspections accurately reflect the financial con-
dition of individual organizations. If after an in-
spection bank supervisors know everything about
an organization’s financial condition that investors
know, and perhaps more, the question becomes
whether market data can provide incremental
information in the periods between inspections,
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beyond that offered by past inspection results
and regularly reported data. It is important to
note that the issue here is not which of these
sources of information is better or more accu-
rate. To be valuable, market indicators need not
be superior to standard supervisory indicators.
They just have to add a new perspective or
dimension that helps provide a more complete
picture of an institution’s financial health, as
Flannery (forthcoming) suggests. The tests re-
ported in this article address this issue.
We find that a measure of financial via-
bility based on stock prices helps predict the
financial condition of individual banking orga-
nizations, as reflected in their supervisory ratings.
Moreover, this measure provides useful infor-
mation beyond that of past inspection results
and quarterly financial statements. To the extent
that these data are a reasonable proxy for the
full set of information supervisors use between
inspections, these findings indicate the financial
markets can provide useful information to sup-
plement supervisory assessments. The equity-
market data give the right signals—or at least
they are in broad agreement with subsequently
assigned supervisory ratings—and they appear
to contain new, or more timely, information not
reflected by financing accounting statements.
EQUITY-BASED MARKET SIGNALS
The consensus of investors regarding indi-
vidual organizations is reflected in market prices
and price movements. The prices depend on
future payoffs to investors and so are inherently
forward-looking. With money at stake, investors
have a strong incentive to collect valid informa-
tion, evaluate it, and accurately assess the po-
tential risks and rewards. At least in principle, a
sense of what that assessment is can be ex-
tracted from the pricing of any risky claim on a
bank or bank holding company.
In practice, the equity claims of an organi-
zation’s owners have a number of advantages as
a source of this type of information. Compared
with other types of bank-related claims, markets
for common shares are fairly liquid, so the 
quality of the price signals is reasonably high.
Moreover, equity values are sensitive to changes
in the condition of the issuing firm, making
those changes easier to observe in share prices.
Equity claims present some complications
because shareholders benefit if the issuer does
well but have limited downside risk should
losses occur, given the legal limits on their lia-
bility. Shareholders’ limited liability is a particu-
larly prominent issue in banking, since deposit
insurance severely restricts or altogether elimi-
nates the downside risk for depositors, leaving
a substantial degree of that risk with the deposit
insurance fund. However, models have been
developed to account for these factors.
One prominent model is the option-based
framework developed by Merton (1974, 1977).
This model relies on the fact that under limited
liability, equity is equivalent to a call option on
the issuer’s assets. With the analogy to options,
the technology of option pricing can be brought
to bear, and information on investors’ implicit
views of risk can be extracted from stock prices.
This model has often been used in the banking
context.
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KMV LLC has commercially implemented a
variant of this model and incorporated propri-
etary elements that extend the basic Merton
approach. Crosbie (1999) describes the KMV
framework, in which the EDF
™ credit measure
serves as a summary measure of default risk.
(EDF is an acronym for expected default fre-
quency.) In essence, the EDF measure for a firm
represents an estimate of the percentage of firms
in the same financial condition that historically
defaulted on an obligation within the next
twelve months. We use KMV’s EDF credit meas-
ure to investigate market information’s capacity
to supplement supervisory assessments.
A number of studies address the issue of
whether market data can usefully supplement
supervisory monitoring efforts. Flannery (1998)
provides an overview of these and related stud-
ies, many of which focus on subordinated debt.
Relatively recent studies examining equity-
market data include that of Berger, Davies, and
Flannery (2000), who find that supervisory assess-
ments are generally less accurate than equity-
market indicators in anticipating changes in
financial performance, such as earnings, except
when the supervisory assessments are based on
a very recent inspection. Elmer and Fissel (2001)
offer evidence that stock returns can help fore-
cast bank failures. And finally, in the study most
similar to our own, Krainer and Lopez (2001)
find that equity-market information can help
forecast downgrades in the supervisory ratings
assigned to bank holding companies. Our
analysis is distinguished by the estimation of
statistical models based directly on downgrades
from various rating categories, whereas Krainer
and Lopez infer downgrade forecasts from a 
single statistical model based on the level of 
ratings. The estimation of downgrade models
may allow a sharper focus on the contribution
of equity-market data to the identification of
adverse financial changes and at a minimumFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 4
provides a separate vehicle for confirming the
positive results Krainer and Lopez document.
The following section details the types of data
our analysis uses.
DATA
At the holding company level, the primary
supervisory indicator is the BOPEC rating, de-
rived from financial performance along five
dimensions: bank subsidiaries (B), other (non-
bank) subsidiaries (O), the parent company (P),
consolidated earnings (E ), and consolidated capi-
tal (C ). The composite rating forms the basis of
the dependent variables in the regressions
reported below. This rating is defined as fol-
lows: 1—basically sound in every respect; 2—
fundamentally sound but with modest weak-
nesses; 3—financial, operational, or compliance
weaknesses that cause supervisory concern; 4—
serious financial weaknesses that could impair
future viability; and 5—critical financial weak-
nesses that render the probability of near-term
failure extremely high.
Current BOPEC ratings serve as our bench-
mark for banking organizations’ financial safety
and soundness. For many of the largest banking
organizations, this clearly is an oversimplifica-
tion. For these firms, continuous on-site super-
vision provides supervisors with far more infor-
mation about current conditions than can be
captured and conveyed by a single composite
measure, such as the BOPEC rating. Neverthe-
less, for banking organizations in general, the
BOPEC rating is a good summary indicator of
condition, and for the purposes of our analysis
we assume this rating accurately reflects the
financial condition of individual organizations.
With BOPEC ratings as our primary bench-
mark, we examine how these ratings are related
to other types of information. Specifically, we
assess the extent to which various types of infor-
mation can help explain, or predict, the BOPEC
rating an organization will receive once it is
inspected. The variables we use to explain the
level of and changes in BOPEC ratings fall into
three main categories: equity-market data in the
form of EDFs, past supervisory assessments, and
financial accounting data. In combining the vari-
ous data, an effort is made to reflect the flow 
of information as it occurs in real time, after
accounting for reporting lags and other factors.
That is, to predict a BOPEC at any point, we
only use information that realistically would
have been available to bank supervisors.
3 This
allows us to focus on whether market data can
provide incremental information to bank super-
visors between inspections, beyond past inspec-
tion information and regularly reported account-
ing data. The explanatory variables themselves
are summarized in Table 1 and discussed below.
Equity-Market Data
To incorporate information from the equity
market, the analysis includes the EDF credit
measure for individual banking organizations,
as constructed by KMV (EDF ). As described
above, EDF is an estimate of the probability a
firm will default within the next year. As a mea-
sure of credit risk, EDF should be positively
associated with problem BOPEC ratings; while
BOPEC ratings are not explicit estimates of the
probability of default or failure, we would
expect institutions in relatively weak financial
condition to have higher EDF values and higher
(worse) BOPEC ratings. KMV generally releases
data about two weeks after each month’s end,
so EDF is as of the end of the month falling two
months prior to the month in which the corre-
sponding inspection was opened.
Past Supervisory Assessments
To help predict BOPEC ratings for individ-
ual organizations, the analysis includes two vari-
ables reflecting supervisory assessments made
prior to the opening of the current inspection.
The first variable is the rating an organization
Table 1
Definitions of Explanatory Variables
Equity-market data
EDF EDF
™ credit measure (EDF is an acronym for
expected default frequency.)
Past supervisory assessments
BOPEC-1 Composite BOPEC rating from the immediately prior
inspection of the holding company
CAMELS Asset-weighted average composite CAMELS rating
from the most recent exams of individual banks
Financial accounting data
SIZE Log of total assets
CAPITAL Total equity capital
RESERVES Loan-loss reserves
PAST-DUE 30 Loans past due 30–89 days
PAST-DUE 90 Loans past due 90 or more days
NONACCRUAL Nonaccrual loans
SECURITIES Investment securities
LARGE CDs CDs of $100,000 or more
PROVISIONS Loan-loss provisions in quarter
ROA Net income for quarter
NOTES: EDF is proprietary and from KMV LLC. BOPEC-1 and CAMELS are confidential and from
the Federal Reserve Board. SIZE and the financial ratios are based on data from a
regulatory report, Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C),
issued by the Federal Reserve Board. EDF is as of the end of the month falling two
months prior to the month in which the corresponding holding company inspection was
opened. CAMELS is based on the most recent bank exam (one-bank holding company)
or exams (multibank holding company) closed prior to the month in which the correspond-
ing holding company inspection was opened. Financial ratios are scaled by assets,
except for PROVISIONS and ROA, which are relative to average assets.These variables,
along with SIZE, are from the quarter-end two months prior to the three-month period in
which the corresponding holding company inspection was opened.5 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2001
received on its most recent prior inspection
(BOPEC-1), which may be positively related to
the organization’s current rating. In addition,
information is included from a separate bank
exam process, which complements supervision
at the organization level. Bank-level exam re-
sults can trigger changes in an organization’s
BOPEC rating. Ratings at the bank level range
from 1 (best) to 5 (worst), similar to composite
BOPEC ratings, and are referred to as CAMELS
ratings. Composite CAMELS ratings are derived
from the evaluation of six bank-level factors:
capital adequacy (C ), asset quality (A), manage-
ment (M ), earnings (E ), liquidity (L), and sen-
sitivity to market risk (S). The asset-weighted
average of the composite ratings for an organiza-
tion’s bank subsidiary or subsidiaries (CAMELS)
is included to capture supervisory information
at the bank level. The variable CAMELS is based
on the most recent bank exam (one-bank hold-
ing company) or exams (multibank holding
company) closed prior to the month in which
the corresponding holding company inspection
was opened.
Financial Accounting Data
The analysis also controls for the potential
predictive capacity of a number of indicators
based on the quarterly reports banking organi-
zations file with the Federal Reserve. One basic
indicator is an organization’s size. The log of total
assets (SIZE) may reduce the chances of a sub-
standard BOPEC rating if largeness provides
financial strength, through either a greater ability
to diversify risk or a closer relationship with the
broader financial market.
The remaining nine variables are financial
ratios that reflect various aspects of financial
strategy and performance. The balance-sheet vari-
ables are scaled using total assets, and the in-
come statement variables are expressed relative
to average assets. Total equity capital (CAPITAL)
and loan-loss reserves (RESERVES) serve as meas-
ures of capital adequacy. Each of these variables
is expected to reduce the chances of a substan-
dard BOPEC rating. Asset quality is measured
using loans past due thirty to eighty-nine days
(PAST-DUE 30), loans past due ninety or more
days (PAST-DUE 90), and nonaccrual loans
(NONACCRUAL). These variables are expected
to raise the chances of a substandard BOPEC
rating. Liquidity is measured using two vari-
ables: investment securities (SECURITIES) and
certificates of deposit of $100,000 or more
(LARGE CDs).  SECURITIES should reduce the
chances of a substandard rating, while the
reverse is true for LARGE CDs. A reliance on this
latter type of funding is often associated with
aggressive banking strategies and frequently
subjects an organization to added expenses.
Finally, two income-statement variables are
included to capture the effect of asset quality
problems and other factors on profitability: loan-
loss provisions (PROVISIONS), which should
hurt BOPEC ratings, and net income (ROA),
which should help the ratings. The financial
ratios and SIZE are as of the quarter-end two
months prior to the three-month period in
which the corresponding holding company in-
spection was opened. The two-month lag used in
the regressions compensates for lags in the sub-
mission and processing of financial statements.
Sample
The sample is based on bank holding
company inspections opened in the period from
June 1996 through March 2000. Of the 11,450
inspections and corresponding BOPEC ratings
for this period, prior BOPEC ratings are available
for 10,315. While many banking organizations
have publicly traded stock, many more do not.
Largely because of this, equity-market data can
be obtained for only 948 of these 10,315 obser-
vations. Of the 948, supervisory financial reports
are available for 914. Given the lagged structure
of the regressions, the financial reports used are
for the period from first quarter 1996 through
fourth quarter 1999. CAMELS ratings are avail-
able for all of these remaining 914 observations.
RESULTS
Sample Means
Table 2 shows the sample means of the
explanatory variables for the different BOPEC
ratings.
4 Reading across the columns in the first
row of the table, worse supervisory ratings are
associated with a higher EDF. Organizations 
that are assigned worse BOPEC ratings tend to
have had worse ratings at the prior inspection
(BOPEC-1). Weak BOPEC ratings also tend to
be associated with previous supervisory prob-
lems at the bank level (CAMELS ), asset quality
problems (PAST-DUE 30,  PAST-DUE 90, and
NONACCRUAL), a reliance on large CDs (LARGE
CDs), and high loan-loss provisions (PROVI-
SIONS ). In addition, substandard supervisory
ratings are negatively related to capital ade-
quacy (CAPITAL), profitability (ROA), and orga-
nization size (SIZE).
Two minor surprises are that the relation-
ship between investment securities (SECURITIES)
and supervisory ratings is not statistically signifi-
cant (p value ≤ .05) and that loan-loss reserves(RESERVES) do not appear to ameliorate super-
visory problems. However, the positive associa-
tion between RESERVES and supervisory prob-
lems can be explained, as asset quality problems
are not held constant when comparing the aver-
age level of RESERVES across ratings. Problem in-
stitutions are likely to be so in part due to poor
asset quality, which is commonly addressed
through higher loan-loss provisions, leading to
higher levels of reserves. The multivariate statis-
tical techniques used in the next section facili-
tate an assessment of the relationship between
RESERVES and BOPEC ratings that holds asset
quality constant.
Predicting BOPEC Ratings
While Table 2 reveals interesting patterns
involving potential relationships between an
organization’s current BOPEC rating and the ex-
planatory variables, each variable’s importance
in explaining BOPEC ratings cannot be deter-
mined based on the differences in means alone.
To identify each variable’s incremental informa-
tion content in predicting BOPEC ratings, we
estimate a statistical model, or regression, of
BOPEC ratings. If a variable is statistically sig-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 6
nificant in this regression, the variable conveys
useful predictive information beyond whatever
information may be contained in the other vari-
ables. As a first step, all the variables listed in
Table 1 are included in the regression. The least
significant variable is then dropped from con-
sideration, and the regression is estimated again.
This process is repeated until all the included
variables are statistically significant.
The first column of Table 3 shows the
results. The key finding is that the equity-market
variable, EDF, is highly significant in explaining
BOPEC ratings, indicating stock prices provide
useful predictive information, even after taking
into account past rating information and infor-
mation from the quarterly financial statements
banking organizations file between inspections.
The positive sign of the estimated coefficient on
EDF indicates supervisory problems are associ-
ated with higher values of EDF, as would be
expected. The other significant variables are
BOPEC-1, CAMELS, CAPITAL, RESERVES, PAST-
DUE 90, NONACCRUAL, PROVISIONS, and ROA.
The sign of the coefficient on each of these vari-
ables corresponds to expectations. For example,
lower values of ROA are associated with more
severe supervisory problems. SIZE, PAST-DUE 30,
SECURITIES, and LARGE CDs are not significant
in explaining BOPEC ratings.
To assess the extent of EDF ’s contribution
to the ability to predict BOPEC ratings, the sec-
ond column of Table 3 displays the results of
estimating the regression in column 1 with EDF
excluded. The predictive capacity of the two
regressions can be compared based on the
measures of association shown in the last three
rows of the table. For the purposes of these
measures, pairs of observations are categorized
as concordant (loosely speaking, the model gets
it right), discordant (the model gets it wrong), 
or tied. A high incidence of concordant pairs,
together with a low incidence of discordant
pairs, indicates superior predictive capacity in
the form of a close association between pre-
dicted and actual outcomes. The statistic gamma
is a summary measure based on the number of
concordant and discordant pairs; a high gamma
value reflects superior predictive performance.
The maximum value for gamma is 1. As the first
and second columns of Table 3 show, the meas-
ures of association register only slightly better
values for the regression including EDF than for
the regression excluding it.
However, the regressions shown in the first
and second columns apply to BOPEC ratings in
general, most of which are unchanged from the
prior inspection. Given the significant inertia in
Table 2
Sample Means




EDF .25 .39 1.33 2.89 .001
Past supervisory assessments
BOPEC-1 1.16 1.91 2.66 2.71 .001
CAMELS 1.15 1.86 2.57 2.43 .001
Financial accounting data
SIZE 15.22 14.90 13.89 12.81 .001
CAPITAL 9.16 8.28 6.86 6.15 .001
RESERVES .97 .99 1.12 1.62 .001
PAST-DUE 30 .69 .78 .86 1.34 .001
PAST-DUE 90 .12 .17 .24 .54 .001
NONACCRUAL .30 .46 .90 1.30 .001
SECURITIES 24.71 23.53 21.89 24.75 .115
LARGE CDs 8.68 9.93 10.61 13.71 .007
PROVISIONS .06 .07 .16 .77 .001
ROA .36 .30 .14 –.21 .001
Observations 449 428 29 7 —
NOTES: Dates are for the quarterly Y-9C data used to construct the financial ratios. Correspond-
ing dates for EDF, CAMELS, and the current BOPEC rating are in the Table 1 notes.
Composite BOPEC ratings are defined as follows: 1—basically sound in every respect;
2—fundamentally sound but with modest weaknesses; 3—financial, operational, or
compliance weaknesses that cause supervisory concern; 4—serious financial weak-
nesses that could impair future viability; and 5—critical financial weaknesses that render
the probability of near-term failure extremely high.To preserve the data’s confidentiality,
the sample’s single 5-rated observation is not shown. P values less than or equal to 
.05 are associated with statistical significance. For BOPEC-1, the p value is determined
by a likelihood ratio chi-square test, based on the ratios of observed and expected
frequencies, for the null hypothesis of no association with current BOPEC ratings.The 
p values for the remaining variables are determined by the k-sample Van der Waerden
test (chi-square approximation) for the null hypothesis of the same location parameter
across BOPEC ratings. Financial ratios are multiplied by 100.7 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2001
Table 3
Probit Regressions of BOPEC Ratings
Ordered regressions, Binary regressions
all rating levels Downgrades from 1 Downgrades from 2
α 1 3.02** 2.88** 2.95** 2.52** .11 –.87
(.37) (.36) (.47) (.45) (.83) (.74)
α 2 6.89** 6.47**
(.44) (.41)
α 3 10.24** 8.74**
(.71) (.61)
α 4 18.02** 14.65**
(1.85) (1.63)
Equity-market data





CAMELS 1.65** 1.60** 1.97** 1.94**
(.15) (.14) (.27) (.26)
Financial accounting data
CAPITAL –10.18** –10.36** –27.29* –25.67*
(3.37) (3.29) (11.02) (10.09)
RESERVES –52.71** –46.52**
(17.70) (17.03)
PAST-DUE 90 117.7** 98.76** 148.7* 129.6*
(31.25) (30.64) (66.74) (64.57)
NONACCRUAL 43.02** 35.99* 117.8** 91.95**
(16.19) (15.98) (31.92) (28.60)
PROVISIONS 235.9** 190.6**
(59.22) (56.08)
ROA –141.8** –126.1** –338.9** –375.1** –447.9** –556.8**
(39.65) (35.08) (100.2) (99.64) (151.7) (130.6)
Measures of association
Concordant 95.2 94.8 85.2 82.6 96.3 91.4
Discordant 4.4 4.9 14.4 16.8 3.6 7.8
Gamma .91 .90 .71 .66 .93 .84
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
NOTES: Each type of regression is first estimated using all the variables in Table 1, except that BOPEC-1 is excluded from
the two types of downgrade regressions.The least significant variable in each type of regression is then dropped
from consideration, and the regressions are estimated again.This process is repeated until all the included
variables are significant at the 5 percent level. EDF is then dropped from the resulting regressions for comparison.
Standard errors are in parentheses.The current BOPEC rating is the dependent variable in the ordered
regressions.The likelihood contribution of an observation with a BOPEC rating of i is N(α i – β′ X ) – N(α i–1 – β′ X ),
where N(•) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, α 0 = –∞ , and α 5 = ∞ .The dependent variable is
1 for downgrades and 0 otherwise in the binary regressions.The likelihood contribution of an observation that is
not downgraded is N(α 1 – β′ X ), and the contribution of a downgraded observation is 1 – N(α 1 – β′ X ), where N(•)
is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.The regressions for downgrades from a rating of 1 are
based on 429 observations (BOPEC-1 = 1), including fifty-two downgrades.The regressions for downgrades from
a 2 rating are based on 453 observations (BOPEC-1 = 2), including seventeen downgrades.The predicted
probability of the dependent variable falling into the best category—a rating of 1 for the ordered regressions and 
0 for the downgrade regressions—is grouped into intervals of length .002 and defined as the “event probability.”
A pair of observations with different values of the dependent variable is defined as concordant if the observation
with the best (lowest) value also has a higher event probability.The opposite case is defined as discordant. If a
pair of observations with different values of the dependent variable is neither concordant not discordant, it is
defined as a tie. Let n represent the number of pairs with different values of the dependent variable, c the number
of concordant pairs, and d the number of discordant pairs. Concordant observations are reported as 100 • c/n and
discordant as 100 • d/n.The summary measure of association is the Goodman–Kruskal gamma, an indicator of
rank correlation between the observed ratings and predicted probabilities, defined as (c – d )/(c + d ).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 8
these ratings, the measures of association shown
in the first two columns may not reflect the
extent of EDF ’s help in predicting whether an
organization receives a different rating than it
received during its last inspection. A change 
in rating is an event of considerable super-
visory interest, particularly if the newly assigned
rating is worse than the previous one. Reflecting
these considerations, the next section focuses
on EDF ’s contribution to the ability to predict
supervisory downgrades.
Predicting BOPEC Downgrades
The third and fourth columns of Table 3
show the results of predicting which 1-rated
organizations are downgraded to a rating of 2 
or worse; the fifth and sixth columns apply to
the downgrade of 2-rated organizations to a 3 or
worse. The number of observations involving
downgrades from a rating of 3 or 4 is too small
to support statistical estimation. In the down-
grade regressions we estimate for 1- and 2-rated
organizations, we follow the same procedure
used in estimating the regressions for BOPEC
ratings in general, through which statistically
insignificant variables are sequentially elimi-
nated from the list of variables in Table 1.
As Table 3 shows, a smaller number of
variables help predict BOPEC downgrades than
BOPEC ratings in general. Nevertheless, EDF is
identified as a statistically significant variable in
predicting BOPEC downgrades for both 1- and
2-rated organizations. In addition, the measures of
association indicate considerably better perfor-
mance for the regressions including EDF than for
the regressions excluding EDF, suggesting EDF ’s
incremental contribution to the ability to predict
BOPEC downgrades is notable.
5 The summary
gamma statistic shows a 7 percent reduction in
the association between predicted and observed
outcomes when EDF is excluded from the
regression predicting downgrades of 1-rated
organizations. And the exclusion of EDF results
in a 10 percent reduction in predictive associa-
tion for downgrades of 2-rated organizations.
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These results indicate equity-market information
is valuable in identifying potential downgrades.
CONCLUSION
Our results show an indicator of financial
viability based on stock prices provides incre-
mental information to bank supervisors during
the periods between inspections, beyond the
information contained in past supervisory ratings
and the quarterly financial statements routinely
used in the supervisory process. We see this
finding as evidence that investors’ views regard-
ing the financial condition of individual bank-
ing organizations, as distilled from equity prices,
provide a useful supplement to supervisory
assessments. In essence, the markets give the
right signals, and the information they provide
is not redundant.
This interpretation of our results hinges on
whether past rating information and quarterly
accounting data together form a reasonable
proxy for the extent of supervisory information
between inspections. It is important to note that
the supervisory information produced between
inspections in some—and perhaps many—cases
almost surely extends beyond the types of infor-
mation included in our statistical models. This 
is especially true for the largest organizations,
where a continuous on-site presence provides
supervisors with more information about current
conditions than is reflected in the past rating
information and quarterly financial data we use
as standard supervisory indicators. Based on
these considerations, further work is needed to
incorporate additional supervisory information
into the analysis. Related to this work is the
important issue of the extent to which super-
visors systematically quantify any assessments
formed between inspections.
An additional question is whether market
data can provide incremental information, even
when inspections are current. We have shown
market information is useful in tracking financial
conditions, as reflected in BOPEC ratings. But
are BOPEC ratings a comprehensive indicator of
organizations’ financial condition? BOPEC ratings
themselves may be only imperfect indicators of
risk levels. One possible avenue for exploring
this question would be further work along the
lines of Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) that
compares the ability of equity-market informa-
tion and BOPEC ratings to predict additional
indicators of financial condition, such as default.
NOTES
The authors would like to thank KMV LLC for providing
the proprietary data this study uses. They also would
like to acknowledge the helpful comments and sug-
gestions of participants at the Conference on Using
Market Data in Banking Supervision, May 2 and 3,
2001, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis and the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco.
1 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
and U.S. Department of the Treasury (2000).
2 For example, see Ronn and Verma (1986).
3 The data we use to construct financial ratios are from9 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 2001
quarterly financial reports, Consolidated Financial
Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C),
issued by the Federal Reserve Board. Insofar as these
data are subject to revision, the values of our financial
ratios may not reflect their assigned values when the
data were first reported, since we do not have access
to the original data.
4 The sole 5-rated observation is not shown to preserve
the data’s confidentiality.
5 These results are based on the degree of association
within the estimation sample. We have insufficient data
to assess how well the various models forecast events
outside the estimation sample.
6 When all the variables shown in Table 3 are included
in the downgrade regressions, whether they are signifi-
cant or not, the reductions in association resulting from
the exclusion of EDF are 8 percent and 4 percent,
respectively.
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